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 THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
 IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURE
 JEREMY WALDRON
 i. Getting to the Rule of Law
 The Rule of Law is one star in a constellation of ideals that domi
 nate our political morality: the others are democracy, human
 rights, and economic freedom. We want societies to be democratic;
 we want them to respect human rights; we want them to organize
 their economies around free markets and private property to the
 extent that this can be done without seriously compromising social
 justice; and we want them to be governed in accordance with the
 Rule of Law. We want the Rule of Law for new societies—for newly
 emerging democracies, for example—and old societies alike, for
 national political communities and regional and international gov
 ernance, and we want it to extend into all aspects of governments'
 dealings with those subject to them—not just in day-to-day crimi
 nal law, or commercial law, or administrative law but also in law ad
 ministered at the margins, in antiterrorism law and in the exercise
 of power over those who are marginalized, those who can safely be
 dismissed as outsiders, and those we are tempted just to destroy as
 (in John Locke's words) "wild Savage Beasts, with whom men can
 have no Society or Security."1 Getting to the Rule of Law does not
 just mean paying lip service to the ideal in the ordinary security
 of a prosperous modern democracy; it means extending the Rule
 of Law into societies that are not necessarily familiar with it; and
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 in those societies that are familiar with it, it means extending the
 Rule of Law into these darker corners of governance, as well.
 When I pay attention to the calls that are made for the Rule of
 Law around the world, I am struck by the fact that the features that
 people call attention to are not necessarily the features that legal
 philosophers have emphasized in their academic conceptions. Le
 gal philosophers tend to emphasize formal elements of the Rule of
 Law, such as rule by general norms rather than particular decrees;
 rule by laws laid down in advance rather than by retrospective en
 actments; rule under a system of norms that has sufficient stability
 (is sufficiently resistant to change) so as to furnish for those sub
 ject to the norms a calculable basis for running their lives or their
 businesses; rules by norms that are made public, not hidden away
 in the closets of bureaucracy; rule by clear and determinate legal
 norms, norms whose meaning is not so obscure or contestable as
 to leave those who are subject to them at the mercy of official dis
 cretion. These are formal aspects of the Rule of Law, because they
 concern the form of the norms that are applied to our conduct:
 generality, prospecdvity, stability, publicity, clarity, and so on. But
 we don't value them just for formalistic reasons. In F. A. Hayek's
 theory of the Rule of Law, we value these features for the contribu
 don they make to predictability, which Hayek thinks is indispens
 able for liberty.2 In Lon Fuller's theory, we value them also for the
 way they respect human dignity: "To judge [people's] actions by
 unpublished or retrospective laws ... is to convey to [them] your
 indifference to [their] powers of self-determination."3 (I shall say
 more about this in secdon 5.) In Fuller's theory, too, there is a
 hunch that if we respect dignity in these formal ways, we will find
 ourselves more inhibited against more substantive assaults on dig
 nity and justice. That has proved very controversial, but it is fur
 ther evidence of the point that the interests of those who adopt a
 formal conception of the Rule of Law are not just formalistic.
 I have said that this formal conception is not what ordinary
 people have in the forefront of their minds when they clamor for
 the extension of the Rule of Law into settings or modes of gover
 nance where it has not been present before. Saying that is usu
 ally a prelude to a call for a more substantive vision of the Rule
 of Law. I am not as hostile as I once was to a substantive concep
 tion of this ideal.41 believe that there is a natural overlap between
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 substantive and formal elements, not least because—as we have
 just seen—the formal elements are usually argued for on substan
 tive grounds of dignity and liberty. I still believe that it is important
 not to let our enthusiasm for a substantive conception—whereby
 the Rule of Law is treated as an ideal that calls directly for an end
 to human rights abuses or as an ideal that calls directly for free
 markets and respect for private property rights—obscure the inde
 pendent importance that the formal elements I have mentioned
 would have even if these other considerations were not so directly
 at stake.5 But it is probably a mistake to exaggerate the distinctive
 ness of our several political ideals or the clarity of the boundaries
 between them.
 Still, it is not a substantive conception that I have in mind when
 I say that ordinary people are urging something other than the
 formal elements that I have mentioned when they clamor for
 the Rule of Law. Instead, I have in mind elements of legal proce
 dure and the institutions, like courts, that embody them. When
 people clamored recently in Pakistan for a restoration of the Rule
 of Law, their concern was for the independence of the judiciary
 and the attempt by an unelected administration to fire a whole
 slew of judges.6 When people clamor for the Rule of Law in China,
 they are demanding impartial tribunals that can adjudicate their
 claims. And when advocates for the detainees in the American
 base at Guantanamo Bay clamor for the Rule of Law, they are
 clamoring for hearings on their clients' comprehensive loss of lib
 erty in which they or their clients would have an opportunity to
 put their case, confront and examine the evidence against them,
 such as it is, and make arguments for their freedom, in accordance
 with what we would say were normal legal procedures.7
 2. Laundry Lists
 What sort of procedural principles do I have in mind? Theorists of
 the Rule of Law are fond of producing laundry lists of demands.
 The best known are the eight formal principles of Lon Fuller's "in
 ner morality of law":8
 1. Generality;
 2. Publicity;
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 7. Stability; and
 8. Congruence.
 I think we need to match this list with a list of procedural charac
 teristics that are equally indispensable. As a preliminary sketch,9
 we might say that no one should have any penalty, stigma, or seri
 ous loss imposed upon him by government except as the upshot of
 procedures that involve:
 A. A hearing by an impartial tribunal that is required to act
 on the basis of evidence and argument presented formally
 before it in relation to legal norms that govern the imposi
 tion of penalty, stigma, loss, and so forth;
 B. A legally trained judicial officer, whose independence of
 other agencies of government is ensured;
 C. A right to representation by counsel and to the time and
 opportunity required to prepare a case;
 D. A right to be present at all critical stages of the proceeding;
 E. A right to confront witnesses against the detainee;
 F. A right to an assurance that the evidence presented by the
 government has been gathered in a properly supervised
 way;
 G. A right to present evidence in one's own behalf;
 H. A right to make legal argument about the bearing of the
 evidence and about the bearing of the various legal norms
 relevant to the case;
 I. A right to hear reasons from the tribunal when it reaches
 its decision that are responsive to the evidence and argu
 ments presented before it; and
 J. Some right of appeal to a higher tribunal of a similar char
 acter.
 These requirements are often associated with terms such as "natu
 ral justice,"10 and as such they are important parts of the Rule of
 Law. I believe we radically sell short the idea of the Rule of Law if
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 we understand it to comprise a list like Fuller's list (l)-(8) with
 out also including something like the procedural list (A)-(J) that
 I have just set out. We say the Rule of Law is violated when due
 attention is not paid to these procedural matters or when the in
 stitutions that are supposed to embody these procedures are un
 dermined or interfered with. Equally, I think we misrepresent the
 debate about whether the Rule of Law has also a substantive di
 mension if we do not contrast a possible list of substantive items
 —such as:
 (а) Respect for private property;
 (ß) Prohibitions on torture and brutality;
 (y) A presumption of liberty; and
 (б) Democratic enfranchisement
 —with both of the lists I have set out (the formal list and the proce
 dural list), rather than with the formal list by itself.
 3. Form and Procedure in the Work of
 Hayek, Fuller, and Dicey
 It is remarkable how little attention is paid to demands of this proce
 dural kind—demands like (A)-(J)—in the literature in academic
 legal and political philosophy devoted specifically to discussion of
 the Rule of Law.
 The key chapter in F. A. Hayek's book, The Constitution of Lib
 erty—the chapter titled "Laws, Commands, and Order"—makes
 no mention whatever of courts or legal procedures; it is wholly
 concerned with the relation between formal characteristics like
 abstraction and generality and individual freedom.11 Later chap
 ters in that book do talk a little about courts but hardly ever about
 their procedures.12 The same is true of Hayek's later work on the
 Rule of Law, in his trilogy Law, Legislation and Liberty. Hayek talks a
 lot about the role of judges in chapter 5 of the first volume of that
 work. But it is all about the role of judges in generating norms of
 the appropriate form, rather than about the procedures that char
 acterize courtrooms.13
 The case of Lon Fuller is even more instructive. Fuller calls his
 internal morality of law—comprising (1) generality, (2) publicity,
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 (3) prospectivity, and so on—"procedural," but what he seems to
 mean is that it is not substantive. Fuller says this:
 As a convenient (though not wholly satisfactory) way of describing
 the distinction ... we may speak of a procedural, as distinguished
 from a substantive natural law. What I have called the internal
 morality of law is in this sense a procedural version of natural law,
 though to avoid misunderstanding the word "procedural" should
 be assigned a special and expanded sense so that it would include,
 for example, a substantive accord between official action and en
 acted law. The term "procedural" is, however, broadly appropriate
 as indicating that we are concerned, not with the substantive aims
 of legal rules, but with the ways in which a system of rules for gov
 erning human conduct must be constructed and administered if it
 is to be efficacious and at the same time remain what it purports
 to be.14
 In fact, substantive can be contrasted either with procedural or with
 formal, the two contrasts are quite different, and patentiy what
 Fuller has in mind is what we should call a formal/substantive con
 trast.15 The features of his internal morality of law all relate to the
 form that legal norms take, not to either the procedure of their
 enactment or (more important) the procedural mode of their ad
 ministration. Among his eight desiderata, only one comes close to
 being procedural (in the sense I am distinguishing from formal),
 namely the requirement of congruence between official action
 and law on the books—yet that is the one for which he says (in
 the passage quoted) "the word 'procedural' should be assigned a
 special and expanded sense"!
 The point is that there is very little about due process or court
 room procedure in Fuller's account of law's internal morality in
 chapters 2 and 3 of The Morality of Law.16 Much the same is true of
 Fuller in his earlier response to H. L. A. Hart's Holmes Lecture.17
 There, too, Fuller focuses on what we should call formal character
 istics of law—generality, publicity, consistency, and so on—and his
 argument that they are prophylactics against injustice is based on
 an incompatibility between evil ends and law's forms.
 [C]oherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence and
 evil. Accepting this belief, I also believe that when men are com
 pelled to explain and justify their decisions, the effect will generally
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 be to pull those decisions toward goodness, by whatever standards
 of ultimate goodness there are. . . . [E]ven in the most perverted
 regimes there is a certain hesitancy about writing cruelties, intoler
 ances, and inhumanities into law.18
 The whole of his discussion along these lines, and the whole of his
 excoriation of Nazi "legality," has to do with legislative form, not
 judicial procedure. That is the ground on which Fuller makes what
 we would call his "Rule of Law" argument.
 I do not mean that Fuller was uninterested in procedure. To
 wards the end of chapter 4 of The Morality of Law, there is some
 consideration about whether the internal morality of law applies
 to the processes by which allocative decisions are made by govern
 ment agencies in a mixed economy. Fuller says we face problems
 of institutional design "unprecedented in scope and importance."
 It is inevitable that the legal profession will play a large role in solv
 ing these problems. The great danger is that we will unthinkingly
 carry over to new conditions traditional institutions and procedures
 that have already demonstrated their faults of design. As lawyers
 we have a natural inclination to "judicialize" every function of gov
 ernment. Adjudication is a process with which we are familiar and
 which enables us to show to advantage our special talents. Yet we
 must face the plain truth that adjudication is an ineffective instru
 ment for economic management and for governmental participa
 tion in the allocation of economic resources.19
 This seems to indicate an interest in procedural as well as formal
 aspects of the Rule of Law (and, indeed, a skepticism about their
 . applicability across the board of all government functions) .20 But it
 is remarkable that the interest in the adjudicative process shown in
 this passage is not matched by anything in the earlier discussion in
 his book of the inner morality of law.
 Fuller was in fact a great proceduralist, who made an immense
 contribution to our understanding of the judicial process.21 Nicola
 Lacey has ventured the suggestion that Fuller would have been
 on much stronger ground in his argument with Hart had he fo
 cused on procedural and institutional as well as formal aspects of
 legality.22 But he allowed Hart to set the agenda, with the crucial
 question "What is law and what is its relation to morality?" and did
 not force him to open that up, in any particular way, to "What, in
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 terms of institutional procedures, is a legal system, and what is the
 relation of all that to morality?"
 Fortunately, we are not bound to follow him in that. I think we
 can usefully pursue a procedural (and institutional) dimension of
 the Rule of Law, as well as a formal dimension, and distinguish
 both of them (separately as well as joindy) from a more substantive
 conception. There is certainly precedent for this elsewhere in the
 Rule of Law literature.
 Albert Venn Dicey, for example, when he explained the Rule of
 Law as a distinguishing feature of the English Constitution, identi
 fied it in the first instance with the following feature:
 When we say that the supremacy or the rule of law is a characteris
 tic of the English constitution, we . . . mean, in the first place, that
 no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or
 goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary
 legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land. In this sense the rule
 of law is contrasted with every system of government based on the
 exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary
 powers of constraint.23
 The passage I have emphasized is important. Without it, we tend
 to read the contrast between the rule of law and arbitrary govern
 ment in terms of the application of a rule versus purely individual
 ized application of punishment (without guidance by a rule). With
 it, however, the contrast between law and discretion has to do with
 institutions and procedures: a person must not be made to suffer
 except pursuant to a decision of a court arrived at in the ordinary
 manner observing ordinary legal process.
 When E. R Thompson insisted (alarming his fellow Marxists)
 that the Rule of Law was "an unqualified human good" and a "cul
 tural achievement of universal significance,"24 he did so by refer
 ence in large part to the importance of procedure:
 [N]ot only were the rulers (indeed, the ruling class as a whole) in
 hibited by their own rules of law against the exercise of direct un
 mediated force (arbitrary imprisonment, the employment of troops
 against the crowd, torture, and those other conveniences of power
 with which we are all conversant), but they also believed enough
 in these rules, and in their accompanying ideological rhetoric, to
 allow, in certain limited areas, the law itself to be a genuine forum
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 within which certain kinds of class conflict were fought out. There
 were even occasions . . . when the Government itself retired from
 the courts defeated.25
 As I said earlier, in recent legal philosophy the phrase "the Rule of
 Law" is often used to conjure up a sort of laundry list of features
 that a healthy legal system should have. These are mosdy variations
 of the eight formal desiderata of Lon Fuller's "internal morality,"26
 but occasionally procedural and institutional considerations creep
 in. Thus, the fourth, fifth, and seventh items on Joseph Raz's list
 are the following: "(4) The independence of the judiciary must
 be guaranteed ... (5) The principles of natural justice must be
 observed ... [o]pen and fair hearing, absence of bias, and the like
 ... (7) The courts should be easily accessible."27 The justifications
 Raz gives often go to the issue of legal determinacy (e.g., "Since
 the court's judgment establishes conclusively what is the law in the
 case before it, the litigants can be guided by law only if the judges
 apply the law correctly"), but at least the procedural and institu
 tional considerations rate a mention.
 In many other discussions of the Rule of Law, however, the
 procedural dimension is simply ignored (or, worse, it is assumed
 thoughdessly that the procedural dimension is taken care of by
 calling the formal dimension "procedural"). I do not mean that
 judges and courts are ignored. In the last Nomos volume devoted
 to this subject, there is extensive discussion of judicial authority
 and judicial discretion: some of it is about equitable decision by
 judges in hard cases (together with an intriguing account of the
 idea of practical wisdom as applied to the judiciary), and some
 of it is about the interpretive techniques that judges should use
 in difficult cases.28 But, if one didn't know better, one would in
 fer from these discussions that problems were just brought to
 wise individuals called judges for their decision (with or without
 the help of sources of law) and that the judges in question pro
 ceeded to deploy their interpretive strategies and practical wisdom
 to address those problems; there is no discussion in these papers
 of the highly proceduralized hearings in which problems are pre
 sented to a court, let alone the importance of the various proce
 dural rights and powers possessed by individual litigants in rela
 tion to these hearings. Certainly, there is no indication by any of
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 the volumes' contributors that the procedures themselves and the
 rights and powers associated with them are in and of themselves
 part of what we value under the heading of "the Rule of Law."
 4. Procedure and the Concept of Law
 Elsewhere I have remarked on an interesting parallel between
 the failure of some of our leading theorists of the Rule of Law to
 highlight procedural (as opposed to formal) considerations and
 the failure of our leading legal philosophers to include procedural
 and institutional elements in their conception of law itself.29
 For my part, I do not think we should regard something as a le
 gal system absent the existence and operation of the sort of institu
 tions we call courts. By courts, I mean institutions that apply norms
 and directives established in the name of the whole society to indi
 vidual cases and that settle disputes about the application of those
 norms. And I mean institutions that do this through the medium
 of hearings, formal events that are tightly structured procedurally
 in order to enable an impartial body to determine the rights and
 responsibilities of particular persons fairly and effectively after
 hearing evidence and argument from both sides.30
 It is remarkable how little there is about courts in the con
 ceptual accounts of law presented in modern positivist jurispru
 dence. The leading source is H. L. A. Hart's magisterial work,
 The Concept of Law. Hart conceives of law in terms of the union
 of primary rules of conduct and secondary rules that govern the
 way in which the primary rules are made, changed, applied, and
 enforced. He certainly seems to regard something like courts as es
 sential. When he introduces the concept of secondary rules, he
 talks of the emergence of "rules of adjudication" in the transition
 from a pre-legal to a legal society: "secondary rules empowering
 individuals to make authoritative determinations of the question
 of whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has been bro
 ken."31 Notice, however, that this account defines the relevant in
 stitutions simply in terms of their output function—the making
 of "authoritative determinations ... of whether ... a primary rule
 has been broken." There is nothing on the distinctive process by
 which this function is performed.32 A Star Chamber proceeding
 ex parte without any sort of hearing would satisfy Hart's definition;
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 and so would the tribunals we call in the antipodes "kangaroo
 courts."
 Much the same is true of Joseph Raz's view about the impor
 tance of what he calls primary norm-applying institutions in Prac
 tical Reason and Norms and elsewhere.33 Raz believes that norm
 applying institutions are key to our understanding of legal systems
 (much more so than legislatures) .34 Now, there are all sorts of in
 stitutionalized ways in which norms may be applied, according to
 Raz, but "primary norm-applying organs" are of particular interest.
 Raz describes their operation as follows: "They are institutions with
 power to determine the normative situation of specified individu
 als, which are required to exercise these powers by applying exist
 ing norms, but whose decisions are binding even when wrong."35
 He tells us that "[c]ourts, tribunals and other judicial bodies are
 the most important example of primary organs."36 In his abstract
 philosophical account, however, the operation of primary norm
 applying institutions is understood solely in terms of output (and
 in terms of what is done with their output). Again, there is nothing
 about mode of operation or procedure. Secret military commis
 sions might meet to "determine the normative situation of speci
 fied individuals ... by applying existing norms" in the absence of
 the individuals in question and without affording any sort of hear
 ing. The impression one gets from Raz's account is that a system
 of rule dominated by institutions like that would count as a legal
 system. Of course, Raz would criticize such institutions, and, as we
 have seen, he might use the ideal of the Rule of Law to do so.37 But
 he seems to suggest that this is relevant to law only at an evaluative
 level, not at the conceptual level.
 I think there is a considerable divergence here between what
 these philosophers say about the concept of law and how the term
 is ordinarily used. Most people, I think, would regard hearings and
 impartial proceedings and the safeguards that go with them as an
 essential, rather than a contingent, feature of the institutional ar
 rangements we call legal systems.38 Their absence would for most
 people be a disqualifying factor, just like the absence of free and
 fair elections in what was alleged to be a democracy.
 Moreover, a procedural conception of the Rule of Law helps
 bring our conceptual thinking about law to life. There is a distress
 ing tendency among academic legal philosophers to see law simply
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 as a set of normative propositions and to pursue their task of devel
 oping an understanding of the concept of law to consist simply in
 understanding what sort of normative propositions these are. But
 law comes to life in institutions. An understanding of legal systems
 that emphasizes argument in the courtroom as much as the exis
 tence and recognition of rules provides the basis for a much richer
 understanding of the values and requirements that law and legal
 ity represent in modern political argument.
 If it were up to me, I would bring the two concepts together—
 the concept of law and the concept of legality or the Rule of Law. I
 would suggest that the concept of law should be understood along
 Fullerian lines to embrace the fundamental elements of legality,
 but I would argue this only if the latter were understood to give
 pride of place to procedural and institutional elements. You may
 be relieved to hear that that is not the task of the present essay.
 However, I have attempted this elsewhere and so have one or two
 others.39 But it is not the received position. According to Joseph
 Raz and others, you cannot understand what the Rule of Law is
 unless you already and independently understand what law is and
 the characteristic evils law is likely to give rise to.401 mention this
 further conceptual debate in order to register the points that the
 absence of a proper emphasis on procedural aspects on either side
 —in the academic account of the concept of law and in the aca
 demic account of the Rule of Law—may have a common source
 and may have something to do with our inability to see the con
 nection between the two ideas.
 5. Procedure and the Underlying Moral Concerns
 When Fuller developed his formal principles of generality, pro
 spectivity, clarity, stability, consistency—principles whose obser
 vance is bound up with the basics of legal craftsmanship41—legal
 positivists expressed bewilderment as to why he called this set of
 principles a "morality."42 He did so because he thought his eight
 principles had inherent moral significance. It was not only that he
 believed that observing them made it much more difficult to do
 substantive injustice, though this he did believe.43 It was also be
 cause he thought observing the principles he identified was itself a
 way of respecting human dignity:
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 To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to rules
 involves ... a commitment to the view that man is ... a responsible
 agent, capable of understanding and following rules. . . . Every de
 parture from the principles of law's inner morality is an affront to
 man's dignity as a responsible agent. To judge his actions by un
 published or retrospective laws, or to order him to do an act that
 is impossible, is to convey . . . your indifference to his powers of
 self-determination 44
 I think what Fuller said about the connection between his formal
 principles and dignity can be said even more about the connec
 tion between procedure and dignity.
 The essential idea of procedure is much more than merely
 functional: applying norms to individual cases. It is partly struc
 tural; it involves Martin Shapiro's idea of the triad structure:45 a
 first party, a second opposing party, and, above them, a separate,
 impartial officer with the authority to make a determination. Most
 important, it is procedural: the operation of a court involves a way
 of proceeding that offers those who are immediately concerned
 in the dispute or in the application of the norm an opportunity
 to make submissions and present evidence (such evidence being
 presented in an orderly fashion according to strict rules of rel
 evance oriented to the norms whose application is in question).
 The mode of presentation may vary, but the existence of such an
 opportunity does not. Once presented, the evidence is made avail
 able to be examined and confronted by the other party in open
 court. And each party has the opportunity to present arguments
 and submissions at the end of this process and to answer those of
 the other party. In the course of all of this, both sides are treated
 respectfully, if formalistically, but, above all, they are listened to
 by a tribunal that (as Lon Fuller stressed in his work "Forms and
 Limits of Adjudication") is bound in some manner to attend to
 the evidence presented and to respond to the submissions that are
 made in the reasons it eventually gives for its decision.46
 These are abstract characteristics, and, of course (as I said), it
 would be a mistake to try to get too concrete given the variety of
 court-like institutions in the world. But they are not just arbitrary
 abstractions. They capture a deep and important sense associated
 foundationally with the idea of a legal system, that law is a mode
 of governing people that treats them with respect, as though they
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 had a view or perspective of their own to present on the applica
 tion of the norm to their conduct and situation. Applying a norm
 to a human individual is not like deciding what to do about a ra
 bid animal or a dilapidated house. It involves paying attention to
 a point of view and respecting the personality of the entity one is
 dealing with. As such, it embodies a crucial dignitarian idea—re
 specting the dignity of those to whom the norms are applied as
 beings capable of explaining themselves. None of this is present in the
 dominant positivist account; all of it, I submit, should be regarded
 as an essential aspect of our working conception of law.
 6. Apprehensions about Lawlessness
 Think of the concerns expressed about the plight of detainees in
 Guantanamo Bay from 2003 to the present. When jurists worried
 that the detention facility there was a "black hole" so far as legal
 ity was concerned,47 it was precisely the lack of these procedural
 rights that they were concerned about. What the detainees de
 manded, in the name of the Rule of Law, was an opportunity to ap
 pear before a proper legal tribunal, to confront and answer the ev
 idence against them (such as it was), and to be represented so that
 their own side of the story concerning their detention could be
 explained to a tribunal that (as I said) would be required to listen
 and respond to the arguments that were made. That was the gist
 of their habeas corpus demands. No doubt the integrity of these
 proceedings would depend in part on the formal characteristics
 of the legal norms (whether laws and customs of armed conflict or
 other antiterrorist laws) that were supposed to govern their deten
 tion, whose application in their case they could call in question at
 the hearings that they demanded; no doubt the formal features
 stressed by Fuller, Hayek, and others would be important, because
 it is very difficult to make a case at a hearing if the laws govern
 ing detention are unacceptably vague, or indeterminate, or kept
 secret. Even so, we still miss out on a whole important dimension
 of the Rule of Law ideal if we do not also focus on the procedural
 demands themselves, which, as it were, give the formal side of the
 Rule of Law this purchase.48
 These concerns are prominent not just in extreme cases like
 Guantanamo Bay. Among working lawyers, they have been at the
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 forefront of concerns about the compatibility of the Rule of Law
 with the modern administrative state. When Dicey spoke of a "De
 cline in Reverence for the Rule of Law" in England at the begin
 ning of the twentieth century, one of the things he had in mind
 was the transfer of authority to impose penalties or take away prop
 erty or livelihood from courts to administrative entities, and the
 content of his concern was precisely that those entities would not
 act as courts acted, would not feel constrained by rules of proce
 dure and other scruples of "natural justice" in the way that judges
 characteristically felt constrained.49 True, even Dicey expressed
 this partly in terms of the existence of determinate rules:
 State officials must more and more undertake to manage a mass of
 public business. . . . But Courts are from the nature of things un
 suited for the transaction of business. The primary duty of a judge
 is to act in accordance with the strict rules of law. He must shun,
 above all things, any injustice to individuals. The well-worn and of
 ten absurdly misapplied adage that "it is better that ten criminals
 should escape conviction than that one innocent man should with
 out cause be found guilty of crime" does after all remind us that the
 first duty of a judge is not to punish crime but to punish it without
 doing injustice. A man of business, whether employed by a private
 firm or working in a public office, must make it his main object to
 see that the business in which he is concerned is efficiendy carried
 out. He could not do this if tied down by the rules which rightly
 check the action of a judge.50
 I guess one could parse this purely in terms of judges (as opposed
 to managers of public business) being bound by determinate rules
 —and then the whole thing could be brought in under Fuller's
 eighth principle of congruence.51 But, again, I think that would
 miss a whole dimension of the matter. It is not simply that one
 bunch of officials are bound to apply determinate rules while an
 other bunch of officials are not; it is that the former operate in the
 context of highly proceduralized institutions in which procedural
 rights and duties of all sorts are oriented to allowing the applica
 tion of determinate rules to be established fairly and minutely with
 ample opportunity for contestation. If we neglect this aspect of the
 Rule of Law, we make much of Dicey's concern about contempo
 rary decline in regard for that ideal quite mysterious.
 Something similar may be true of our concerns about the role
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 of the Rule of Law in nation building. When theorists like Robert
 Barro argue that it is more important to secure the Rule of Law in
 a developing society than it is to secure the institutions of democ
 racy, what they often have in mind is the elimination of corruption
 and the establishment of stable legal institutions.52 We cannot un
 derstand these concerns unless we focus on the distinctive proce
 dural features of legal institutions and their procedural integrity
 vis-à-vis the elimination of corruption, the securing of judicial in
 dependence, the guarantee of due process, and the separation of
 powers.
 True, it has to be said also that sometimes when commenta
 tors call for the Rule of Law to be given priority over democracy
 in developing societies, what they mainly have in mind are quasi
 substantive features like the protection of property, the proper en
 forcement of contracts, and the protection of outside investments,
 and the safeguarding of all this as against democratically enacted
 social-justice or environmental or labor-rights legislation. Some
 times this is quite cynical.53 I have argued vehemently elsewhere
 against this Washington-consensus-based abuse of the idea of the
 Rule of Law.54
 7. Law, Argumentation, and Predictability
 When I set out my preliminary list of procedural characteristics of
 the Rule of Law at the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned the
 requirement that those facing the imposition of penalty, stigma,
 or serious loss at the hands of government must have the right to
 make legal argument about the bearing of the evidence and about
 the bearing of the various legal norms relevant to the case. I be
 lieve this is particularly important. But it also sets up an interesting
 tension between the procedural requirements of the Rule of Law
 and the formal requirements that relate to the determinacy of le
 gal norms.
 In the systems with which we are familiar, law presents itself as
 something one can make sense of. The norms that are adminis
 tered in our legal system may seem like just one damned command
 after another, but lawyers and judges try to see the law as a whole;
 they attempt to discern some sort of coherence or system, integrat
 ing particular items into a structure that makes intellectual sense.55
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 And ordinary people and their representatives take advantage of
 this aspiration to systematicity and integrity in framing their own
 legal arguments, by inviting the tribunal hearing their case to con
 sider how the position they are putting forward fits generally into
 a coherent conception of the spirit of the law. These are not just
 arguments about what the law ought to be—made, as it were, in a
 sort of lobbying mode. They are arguments of reason that present
 competing arguments about what the law is. Inevitably, they are
 controversial: one party will say that such-and-such a proposition
 cannot be inferred from the law as it is; the other party will re
 spond that it can be so inferred if only we credit the law with more
 coherence (or coherence among more of its elements) than peo
 ple have tended to credit it with in the past. And so the determina
 tion of whether such a proposition has legal authority may often
 be a matter of contestation. Law, in other words, becomes a matter
 of argument.56
 In this regard, too, law has a dignitarian aspect: it conceives of
 the people who live under it as bearers of reason and intelligence.
 They are thinkers who can grasp and grapple with the rationale of
 the way they are governed and relate it in complex but intelligible
 ways to their own view of the relation between their actions and
 purposes and the actions and purposes of the state. Once again,
 I don't think we would accept that a society was governed by the
 Rule of Law if its judicial procedures did not afford parties the op
 portunity to make arguments of this kind in complex cases where
 the state was bearing down on them.
 But this strand of the Rule of Law, this strand of dignitarian re
 spect, has a price: it probably brings with it a diminution in law's
 certainty. On my view, the procedural side of the Rule of Law re
 quires that public institutions sponsor and facilitate reasoned ar
 gument in human affairs. But argument can be unsettling, and the
 procedures that we cherish often have the effect of undermining
 the certainty and predictability that are emphasized in the formal
 side of the ideal.57 By associating the Rule of Law with the legal
 process rather than with the form of the determinate norms that
 are supposed to emerge from that process, the procedural aspect
 of the Rule of Law seems to place a premium on values that are
 somewhat different from those emphasized in the formal picture.58
 The formal picture, particularly as it is put forward by thinkers like
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 F. A. Hayek, emphasizes clarity, determinacy, and predictability as
 features of governance that make private freedom possible.59 The
 procedural idea sponsors a certain conception of freedom also,
 but it is more like positive freedom: active engagement in the ad
 ministration of public affairs, the freedom to participate actively
 and argumentatively in the way that one is governed. And that
 positive freedom may stand in some tension with private freedom
 in Hayek's vision of liberty, which presupposes that law is determi
 nate enough to allow people to know in advance where they stand
 and to have some advance security in their understanding of the
 demands that law is likely to impose upon them.
 The tension may also be represented as a tension between vari
 ous strands of dignity associated with the Rule of Law. Fuller, we
 saw, associated his formal criteria with a dignitarian conception
 of the legal subject as an agent capable of monitoring and freely
 governing his own conduct. In its acdon-guiding aspect, law re
 spects people as agents; the Rule of Law is sometimes represented
 as the conditions of such respect.60 But how, it may be asked, can
 we maintain this mode of respect if law becomes contestable and
 uncertain as a result of argumentation? Insisting on an opportu
 nity for argumentation respects dignity, too, but at the cost of di
 minishing the confidence that we can have in the dignity of law's
 self-application at the hands of ordinary individuals. On the other
 hand, it is worth remembering that law consists not only of deter
 minate rules but also standards and that law's confidence in the
 possibility of self-application does not necessarily presuppose that
 it takes the form only of determinate rigid rules. Law's dignitar
 ian faith in the practical reason of ordinary people may be an act
 of faith in their thinking—for example, about what is reasonable
 and what is not—not just in their recognition of a rule and its me
 chanical application. And so also it may be an act of faith not just
 in their ability to apply general moral predicates (such as "reason
 able") to their actions but also to think about and interpret the
 bearing of a whole array of norms and precedents to their con
 duct, rather than just the mechanical application of a single norm.
 So we cannot just brush the argumentative aspect of law's pro
 cedures aside so far as the Rule of Law is concerned. I believe this
 tension in the Rule of Law ideal is largely unavoidable, and we
 should own up to the fact that the Rule of Law points, as it were,
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 in both directions. I think we find symptoms of this tension in the
 ambivalence of the Rule of Law ideal so far as the role of judges in
 society is concerned and in a similar ambivalence about the role of
 litigation.61
 There is no denying that theories that place great stress on legal
 certainty, predictability, and settlement, on the determinacy and
 intelligibility of the norms that are upheld in society, and on the
 relatively straightforward character of their administration by the
 state are among the most influential conceptions of the Rule of
 Law.62 According to these conceptions, the most important thing
 that people need from the law that governs them is certainty and
 predictability in the conduct of their lives and businesses. There
 may be no getting away from legal constraint in the circumstances
 of modern life, but freedom is possible nevertheless if people
 know in advance how the law will operate and how they have to
 act if they are to avoid its application. Knowing in advance how the
 law will operate enables one to make plans and to work around
 its requirements.63 And knowing that one can count on the law's
 protecting certain personal property rights gives each citizen some
 certainty on what he can rely on in his dealings with other people
 and the state. Accordingly, they highlight the role of rules rather
 than standards, literal meanings rather than systemic inferences,
 direct applications rather than arguments, and ex ante clarity
 rather than labored interpretations.64 The Rule of Law is violated,
 on this account, when the norms that are applied by officials do
 not correspond to the norms that have been made public to the
 citizens or when officials act on the basis of their own discretion
 rather than according to norms laid down in advance. If action
 of this sort becomes endemic, then not only are people's expecta
 tions disappointed, but increasingly they will find themselves un
 able to form expectations on which they can rely, and the horizons
 of their planning and their economic activity will shrink accord
 ingly. So it is natural to think that the Rule of Law must condemn
 the uncertainty that arises out of law's argumentative character.
 But the contrary considerations embodied in the procedural
 side of the Rule of Law will not easily give way. As the late and
 lamented Neil MacCormick has pointed out, law is an argumen
 tative discipline, and no analytic theory of what law is and what
 distinguishes legal systems from other systems of governance can
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 afford to ignore this aspect of our legal practice and the distinc
 tive role it plays in a legal system's treating ordinary citizens with
 respect as active centers of intelligence.65 A fallacy of modern posi
 tivism, it seems to me, is its exclusive emphasis on the command
 and-control aspect of law, or the norm-and-guidance aspect of law,
 without any reference to the culture of argument that a legal sys
 tem frames, sponsors, and institutionalizes. The institutionalized
 recognition of a distinctive set of norms may be an important fea
 ture. But at least as important is what we do in law with the norms
 that we identify. We don't just obey them or apply the sanctions
 that they ordain; we argue over them adversarially, we use our
 sense of what is at stake in their application to license a continual
 process of argument back and forth, and we engage in elaborate
 interpretive exercises about what it means to apply them faithfully
 as a system to the cases that come before us.
 When positivists in the tradition of H. L. A. Hart pay attention
 to this aspect of interpretation and argument, they tend to treat it
 as an occasional and problematic sideline. The impression given is
 that, in most cases, the authoritative identification of legal norms
 using a rule of recognition is sufficient; once it is recognized, a
 legal norm can become a straightforward guide to official action.
 But, it is said, occasionally the language is unclear—because words
 have open texture or because our aims are indeterminate or be
 cause for some other reasons there is a hiccough in the interface
 between words and the facts that they apply to—and then, unfor
 tunately, we have no choice but to argue the matter through.66
 And, usually, the positivist will add, the upshot is that the court
 will just have to cut through the Gordian knot and make a new
 rule that can be recognized and applied more readily without any
 attendant controversy.67 But this account radically underestimates
 the point that argumentation (about what this or that provision
 means or about the effect of this array of precedents) is business as
 usual in law. We would be uneasy about counting a system that did
 not exhibit it and make routine provision for it as a legal system.
 So: I don't think that a conception of law or a conception of
 the Rule of Law that sidelines the importance of argumentation
 can really do justice to the value we place on government treat
 ing ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence.
 The demand for clarity and predictability is commonly made in
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 the name of individual freedom—the freedom of the Hayekian in
 dividual in charge of his own destiny who needs to know where he
 stands so far as social order is concerned.68 But, with the best will
 in the world and the most determinate-seeming law, circumstances
 and interactions can be treacherous. From time to time, the free
 Hayekian individual will find himself charged or accused of some
 violation. Or his business will be subject—as he thinks, unjustly or
 irregularly—to some detrimental rule. Some such cases may be
 clear, but others may be matters of dispute. An individual who val
 ues his freedom enough to demand the sort of calculability that
 the Hayekian image of freedom under law is supposed to cater to
 is not someone whom we can imagine always tamely accepting a
 charge or a determination that he has done something wrong. He
 will have a point of view, and he will seek an opportunity to bring
 that to bear when it is a question of applying a rule to his case.
 And, when he brings his point of view to bear, we can imagine his
 plaintiff or his prosecutor responding with a point of view whose
 complexity and tendentiousness matches his own. And so it be
 gins: legal argumentation and the facilities that law's procedures
 make for the formal airing of these arguments.69 Courts, hearings,
 and arguments—those aspects of law are not optional extras; they
 are integral parts of how law works, and they are indispensable
 to the package of law's respect for human agency. To say that we
 should value aspects of governance that promote the clarity and
 determinacy of rules for the sake of individual freedom but not
 the opportunities for argumentation that a free and self-possessed
 individual is likely to demand, is to slice in half, to truncate, what
 the Rule of Law rests upon: respect for the freedom and dignity of
 each person as an active intelligence.
 8. Legal Procedures in Social and
 Political Decision Making
 Alexis de Tocqueville famously remarked that "[sjcarcely any polit
 ical question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner
 or later, into a judicial question."70 Does a proceduralist account
 of the Rule of Law, with its emphasis on due process and the sort
 of argumentation that one finds in courtrooms, endorse this char
 acteristic? Is a society governed by the Rule of Law necessarily a
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 society in which judicial procedures loom large in the settlement
 of social and political questions?
 I think that is, for the most part, an unwarranted extrapolation.
 It is one thing to say that a person threatened by the government
 with penalty, stigma, or serious loss must be offered an opportu
 nity and a setting for argumentatively contesting that imposition.
 It is another thing to say that the courtroom setting, with its highly
 proceduralized modes of consideration, is an appropriate venue
 for settling general questions of common concern in a society. We
 may accept the procedural implications of the Rule of Law—along
 the lines of those set out in my list (A)-(J) in section 2—without
 denying that, nevertheless, in the end, the legislature, rather than
 the courtroom, is the appropriate place for settling such matters.
 Certainly, what happens in the courtroom in argument about par
 ticular applications may affect how the measures enacted in the
 legislature are subsequently understood. That, as I have said, may
 have an effect on predictability, and we should not be in the busi
 ness of trying to avoid that by minimizing the impact of judicial
 proceedings. Such an effect can and will accrue even in a society
 in which courts do not have the power to override legislation, and
 endorsing or accepting that effect by no means amounts to an en
 dorsement of anything like judicial review of legislation.
 I do not mean that the Rule of Law precludes judicial review
 of legislation. I believe that, as a political ideal, it is neutral on the
 issue. In a society with a constitutional Bill of Rights and a prac
 tice of strong judicial review, the Rule of Law requires us to accept
 a much greater role for courts in public decision making than I
 have set out here. In such a society—I am thinking particularly
 of the United States—arguments made in courtrooms according
 to the procedural principles that I say constitute the Rule of Law
 will have a greater impact on the life of a society and a greater
 impact probably on social predictability than they have in a society
 with weak or no judicial review.71 Also, the more robust the Bill of
 Rights, the more it will seem that the upshot of taking the Rule of
 Law seriously is substantive, not just procedural and formal. This,
 I think, is the gist of Dworkin's position on the Rule of Law in A
 Matter of Principle.1*
 Some people argue that the Rule of Law in a society is incom
 plete unless legislatures as much as executive agencies are bound
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 to act in accordance with (higher) constraining laws. I do not ac
 cept that, though I understand the position. Some even say that
 the crucial distinction here is between the Rule of Law and rule
 by law, and they say that a system of legislative supremacy is an
 example of the latter but not the former. A position like this is
 sometimes associated with a general denigration of legislatures—
 as though, in the end, the Rule of Law must amount to something
 other than the rule of men. The position is often associated with
 an almost mythic reverence for common law, not conceived nec
 essarily as deliberately crafted by judges but understood as well
 ing up impersonally as a sort of resultant of the activity of courts.
 Hayek hints at some such nonsense when he writes in The Constitu
 tion of Liberty that most genuine rules of law
 have never been deliberately invented but have grown through a
 gradual process of trial and error in which the experience of suc
 cessive generations has helped to make them what they are. In most
 instances, therefore, nobody knows or has ever known all the rea
 sons and considerations that have led to a rule being given a par
 ticular form.73
 In a similar way, the suggestion that legislatures need to be con
 strained by law rather than regarded as ultimate sources of law of
 ten involves a strange sort of constitutionalist mythology. It sees
 the framing of a constitution or a Bill of Rights as some sort of
 transcendent event—amounting to something other than the rule
 of men (by law): perhaps it is supposed to have been a sponta
 neous effulgence of unprecedented superhuman virtue hovering
 around the activity of giants like James Madison and the Feder
 alists. But I see no reason to associate the Rule of Law with any
 such mythology or to embody in it any denial that law is human in
 origin and often the product of deliberate manufacture. Even if
 positivists (as I have argued) give an inadequate account of it, the
 Rule of Law is, in the end, the rule of positive law; it is a human
 ideal for human institutions, not a magic that somehow absolves us
 from human rule.
 Having said that, let me add two final points by way of qualifica
 tion. First, even in systems of parliamentary supremacy, legislatures
 do act in ways that are constituted by rules, and procedural rules
 at that. (I mention this because, sometimes, when people allude to
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 the procedural side of the Rule of Law, they have in mind the way
 laws are made, rather than—as I have emphasized—the way they
 are administered.) They are—in their own way—highly procedur
 alized institutions, and people rely on their articulated procedures
 as indicating the points of access at which citizens can hope to in
 fluence and participate in their proceedings. It is no accident that
 enemies of the Rule of Law, such as Carl Schmitt, sought compre
 hensively to disparage the rule-governed character of parliamen
 tary democracy.74
 Second, the Rule of Law applies not only within national poli
 ties but also increasingly between them. The Rule of Law as an in
 ternational legal ideal remains undertheorized,75 and I am afraid
 much of the work that has been done on it simply adopts uncriti
 cally the perspective of those who say, at the national level, that the
 ideal consists in determinacy, clarity, and predictability.76 I believe
 there is much more to be said on this. I have tried to say some of
 it in some other writings,77 and I will try to say more. For the mo
 ment, this must suffice: to the extent that we take international law
 seriously, it will be the case that national legislatures, like other na
 tional institutions, will appropriately regard themselves as bound
 and constrained by law in what they do (whether or not they have
 a national Bill of Rights). The content of that constraint will be
 determined by the content of multilateral treaties (including hu
 man rights conventions), by customary international law, and by
 ins cogens provisions of various kinds. The character of the con
 straint will no doubt be determined, formally and procedurally (if
 not substantively), by the ideal of the Rule of Law, adapted to the
 international context. Accordingly, it is a matter of some urgency
 —which more or less implies these days that legal philosophers
 are going to neglect it—to consider what that adaptation of this
 ideal to the international context involves.
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 Waldron, "Legislation and the Rule of Law," 118 ff.
 54. Waldron, "Legislation and the Rule of Law," passim.
 55. See also the discussion in Jeremy Waldron, "Transcendental Non
 sense and System in the Law," Columbia Law Review 100 (2000) : 16, 30-40.
 56. The legal philosopher who has done the most to develop this theme
 is, of course, Ronald Dworkin, particularly in Law's Empire (Cambridge,
 MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
 57. See the discussion of the relation between civil disobedience and
 disputes about which laws are valid in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seri
 ously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 184-205. I have
 discussed this argumentative aspect of Dworkin's conception of the Rule
 of Law in Jeremy Waldron, "The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate,"
 Dworkin and his Critics, ed. Justine Burley (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 319.
 58. See Richard Fallon, "The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional
 Discourse," Columbia Law Review 97 (1997): 1, 6.
 59. See, e.g., Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 152-57.
 60. Raz, "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 214: "This is the basic intuition
 from which the doctrine of the rule of law derives: the law must be capable
 of guiding the behaviour of its subjects."
 61. See the discussion in Jeremy Waldron, "Is the Rule of Law an Essen
 tially Contested Concept (in Florida)?" Law and Philosophy 21 (2002) : 137.
 62. See also T. Carothers, "The Rule of Law Revival," Foreign Affairs 77
 (1998): 95, and Jeffrey Kahn, "The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia,"
 Georgetown Journal of International Law il (2006): 353, 359-61.
 63. See, especially, Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 153 and 156-57.
 64. See also James R. Maxeiner, "Legal Indeterminacy Made in America:
 U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law," Valparaiso University Law Review
 41 (2006): 517, and Antonin Scalia, "The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,"
 University of Chicago Law Review 56 (1989) : 1175.
 65. Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Rea
 soning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 14-15 and 26-28. I am
 gready indebted to MacCormick's account.
 66. Hart, The Concept of Law, 124-36.
 67. Ibid., 135-36.
 68. See, e.g., Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 148-61.
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 69. There is a fine account of this in MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule
 of Law, 12-31.
 70. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Knopf, 1994),
 1:280.
 71. For the contrast between strong and weak judicial review, see Jeremy
 Waldron, "The Core of the Case against Judicial Review," Yale Law Journal
 115 (2006): 1346.
 72. Ronald Dworkin, "Political Judges and the Rule of Law," in his col
 lection A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
 1985), 9.
 73. Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 157. This line of thought is even more
 pronounced in Hayek's later work; see Hayek, Rules and Order, 72 ff.
 74. See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cam
 bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
 75. The papers that I have found most helpful include James Crawford,
 "International Law and the Rule of Law," Adelaide Law Review 24 (2003) : 3,
 and Mattias Kumm, "International Law in National Courts: The Interna
 tional Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model," Virginia
 Journal of International Law 44 (2003): 19.
 76. See Simon Chesterman, The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law:
 The Role of the Security Council in Strengthening a Rules-Based International System
 (Final Report and Recommendations from the Austrian Initiative, 2004
 2008), also published by the Institute for International Law and Justice,
 New York University School of Law, http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 279849.
 77. See Jeremy Waldron, "The Rule of International Law," Harvard Jour
 nal of Law and Public Policy 30 (2006) : 15, and "Are Sovereigns Entided to
 the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?" New York University School
 of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Pa
 per no. 09-01 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323383.
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